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Martin: Seed Savers v. Monsanto: Farmers Need a Victory for Wilting Biodi

SEED SAVERS V. MONSANTO:
FARMERS NEED A VICTORY FOR WILTING
BIODIVERSITY
"It is miserable for a farmer to be obliged to buy his
Seeds; to exchange Seeds may, in some cases, be
useful; but to buy them after the first year is
disreputable," George Washington.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Corn, rice, wheat, and soybeans make up 75% of calories
consumed by the world's population.! These crops were derived
from wild varieties that are in danger of extinction. The world's
food supply is hanging on by a delicate thread of remaining
genetic resistance. Increasing genetic uniformity of these crops
could lead to a world food crisis. One disease strain or type of pest
could severely devastate a large population of any of those four
crops. Without genetic diversity, resistance may be impossible to
locate, and 75% of the world's food supply would not recover. At
the same time, farmers are increasingly losing sovereignty over
their own seeds. Because of utility patent protection on seeds of
major crops, such as soybeans, farmers are restricted from saving
genetically engineered (GE) seeds.4 Without farmers saving seeds,
agriculture is steadily losing a source of genetic diversity that it
cannot afford to lose.

1.

CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, SEED GIANTS V. U.S.

FARMERS 2 (2013) (citing Letter from George Washington to William Pearce,
Farm Manager (Nov. 16, 1794)).
2. Sara Reardon, Climate Change Already Hurting Agriculture, SCIENCE
Now
(May
5,
2011,
4:01
AM),
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/05/climate-change-alreadyhurting.html.
3.

CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS supra note 1, at 20.

4. As used in this paper, the term "genetically engineered seeds" refers to
seeds with inserted genetic seeds. Other terms, such as genetically modified
seeds and transgenic seeds, are used in the same manner and are used
interchangeably throughout this paper. Seeds without GE traits are commonly
referred to as "conventional seeds."
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Industrial agriculture corporations, such as the Monsanto
Company ("Monsanto"), do not see it that way. They argue that
agricultural biotechnology is "vital to meeting the world's growing
food needs,"5 and utility patent protection on seeds is necessary to
develop future "solutions for the issues we face in agriculture
today."' However, Monsanto has used its combination of seed
utility patents, licensing arrangements, and patent infringement
litigation against farmers to restrain competition in the seed
industry. Antitrust law has failed to combat Monsanto's anticompetitive practices. Therefore, patent misuse should be used as
a defense for prosecuted farmers to curb Monsanto's patent
enforcement.
Part II of this article will provide background on the practice of
seed saving, as well as Monsanto's products, patents, licensing
arrangements, and patent infringement litigation. Additionally,
Part II will discuss the evolution of intellectual property protection
Part III will explore how Monsanto's patent
on seeds.
enforcement practices are leading to a dangerous loss of
biodiversity. This section will explore how seed utility patents
spurred the restructuring and consolidation of the seed industry.
Finally, this section will show that farmers, because of the seed
industry consolidation, lack choice when purchasing seeds and
have no available option besides signing Monsanto's restrictive
technology agreements. Farmers are consequently prohibited from
saving seed, which has led to a decrease in genetic variety. Part IV
will discuss the consequences of the decreasing biodiversity. Part
V will discuss how the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court
have treated Monsanto's patent litigation against farmers, and Part
VI will discuss how farmers can use patent misuse as a defense.
Part VII will conclude by examining whether patent protection is
necessary for seed industry innovation, productivity, and creation

5. Anna Lapp6, The Battlefor Biodiversity: Monsanto and Farmers Clash,
Mar.
28,
2011,
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/03/the-battle-for-biodiversitymonsanto-and-farmers-clash/73117/.
6. Improving Agriculture: What is Monsanto Doing to Help?, MONSANTO,
www.monsanto.com/improvingagriculture/Pages/what-is-monsanto-doing-tohelp.aspx (last visited May 4, 2013).
ATLANTIC,

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol24/iss1/4
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of new varieties, as well as whether Monsanto's practices have
helped or harmed American farmers.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the problem presented by this paper, one
must first understand the legal battle at its center. The debate
regarding intellectual property protection of seeds has largely
revolved around two groups of players: individual farmers and
large industrial agriculture corporations. Namely, the traditional
practice of seed saving, practiced by farmers for centuries, is at
direct odds with protecting agricultural corporations' investments
in genetically engineered traits for those seeds. Those two
interests have been at odds throughout the development of seed
protection, with a trend of increasing patent protection of seeds to
the exclusion of farmers' interests.
A. Seed Saving
Saving seed has been a practice of farmers for centuries. Some
even estimate that this tradition stretches back 12,000 years.
Farmers select plants from which to save seed for the next year's
planting based on favorable traits of the plant. These farmers'
efforts have steadily created crop diversity adapted to different
regions, soil types, climates, local pests, diseases, and cultures by
the process of phenotypic selection, where seeds from the
healthiest and most productive plants were selectively saved.'
These cultivated and saved seeds are called "heirloom varieties,"
and evolve with natural and human selection over time.' Each
heirloom variety is genetically distinct. For example, farmers
produced a variety of crops from the cabbage species by selecting

7.
8.
9.

SUZANNE ASHWORTH, SEED TO SEED 15 (2d ed., 2002).
CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 1, at 3.
See Genetic Resources Preservation, SEED SAVERS

www.seedsavers.org/Preservation/Genetic-Resources-Preservation/
May 3, 2013).
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and encouraging the development of different parts of the plant.'
This human selection has allowed for the cultivation of Brussels
sprouts, kohlrabi, cauliflower, broccoli, kale, and cabbage from a
single species."
By saving seeds from desirable, healthy, and productive plants,
farmers steadily increased the quality and yield of their crops for
the following years. As one farmer explains:
The reason for producing our own seed was and
always has been quality. I will pick out only the
very best beans from my field for seed. I can then
carefully store and condition that seed and am
assured that it is treated correctly. I cannot be sure
of this kind of quality anywhere else.'2
Additionally, the domestication process forced plants to adapt to
Farmers developed genetically
their cultivated environment."
distinct varieties adapted to diverse climates through introgression,
"the introduction of a gene from one gene complex to another,
through cross-breeding." 4 Each domesticated seed answered a
very specific challenge presented by each diverse climate."
Furthermore, programs at land-grant universities, the United States
of Agriculture (USDA), and other publicly funded institutions

10. CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS, AND THE
Loss OF GENETIC DIVERSITY 21 (1990).

11. Id. (citing Peter Crisp & George Forster, Banking Seeds for the Future,
105 GARDEN 410 (Oct. 1980)).
12.
FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG'G, OUT OF HAND:
FARMERS FACE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A CONSOLIDATED SEED INDUSTRY 40

(Dec. 2009).
13. As used here, domestication means qualities that stem from adaptation to
cultivation and human harvesting, as compared to wild populations. Dorian Q.
Fuller & Robin Allaby, Seed Dispersal and Crop Domestication: Shattering,
Germination and Seasonablity in Evolution Under Cultivation, in ANNUAL
PLANT REVIEWS 239 (2009).
14. FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 10, at 25.
15.
Charles Siebert, Food Ark, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, July 2011,
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2011/07/food-ark/siebert-text.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol24/iss1/4
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have bred varieties geared towards growers in their specific
geographic regions.16
B. Monsanto Company
Monsanto, a "sustainable agricultural company"," is the
"Goliath" seed company at the center of the issue of patent
protection on seeds. Monsanto "sells seeds, traits developed
through biotechnology, and crop protection chemicals.""
Additionally, Monsanto "owns the most widely adopted seed
technologies, [and] maintains substantial market power" from its
aggressive enforcement of intellectual property rights."
This
section will provide background on Monsanto's seed patent
protection, licensing scheme, and litigation practices with respect
to its "Roundup Ready" soybean seed product.
1. Roundup Ready
Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, with active ingredient
glyphosate, is one of Monsanto's best-selling products.20
Glyphosate is extremely effective against most plants and weeds,
but it is not selective and can severely damage farmers' crops if
sprayed "over-the-top" of crops. 2'
Monsanto developed
recombinant-DNA technology agricultural seed products to protect
crops from being killed by glyphosate, and to increase the use of
Roundup. Monsanto's agricultural seed products are sold through

16. ASHWORTH, supra note 7, at 13; CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR
SEEDS supra note 1, at 3.
17. See MONSANTO, www.monsanto.com (last visited May 4, 2013).
18.
Who
We
Are,
MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 4,
2013).
19. FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG'G supra note 12, at

16.
20. Jason Savich, Note, Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Negative Impact of
Patent Exhaustion on Self-Replicating Technology, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
115, 117 (2007).

2 1. Id.
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its "Roundup Ready" line.22 Roundup Ready soybeans were first
commercialized in 1996, and Monsanto followed with alfalfa,
corn, cotton, spring canola, sugarbeets, and winter canola seeds.2 3
These seeds contain in-plant tolerance to glyphosate herbicide.
Monsanto's seed products' genetically modified tolerance to
glyphosate allows farmers to "spray Roundup agricultural
herbicides in-crop from emergence through flowering for
unsurpassed weed control, proven crop safety and maximum yield
potential."2 4 Therefore, farmers can spray their fields with
Roundup to effectively kill several weeds and grasses, but without
also killing their soybeans.2 5
The adoption of Roundup Ready crops was "unprecedented,"
and some farming organizations claim that its wide-scale adoption
is directly related to the value of the technology.26 As discussed
above, when Roundup is applied to Roundup Ready crops, "it has
a wider window of application than other herbicides, has no soil
activity, which provides flexible crop rotations, and has low
environmental and human health risks."27 By farmers' accounts,
the popular Roundup with Roundup Ready weed control system is
simple, flexible, and can be applied over the soybean crop during
all stages of growth without damaging the crops.28 With the
Roundup system, farmers only need to use one herbicideRoundup-as opposed to previous weed control systems that
22. Id.
23.

Roundup

Ready,

MONSANTO,

http://www.monsanto.com/weedmanagement/Pages/roundup-ready-system.aspx
(last visited May 4, 2013).
24. Id.
25. Amanda Welters, Striking a Balance: Revising USDA Regulations to
Promote Competition Without Stifling Innovation, 13 MINN. J.L. ScL & TECH.
407, 410 (2012).
26. Wisconsin Farmers and Agri-Business Call for Glyphosate (Roundup)
Stewardship,

PENN.

STATE

EXTENSION,

http://extension.psu.edu/pests/weeds/control/glyphosate-wi.pdf (last visited Oct.
20, 2013).
27. Id.
28. Janet Carpenter & Leonard Gianessi, Herbicide Tolerant Soybeans: Why
Growers Are Adopting Roundup Ready Varieties, AGBIOFORUM: J.
BIOTECHNOLOGY

MGMT.

&

ECON.

(1999),

available

at

http://agbioforum.org/v2n2/v2n2a02-carpenter.htm.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol24/iss1/4
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required the use of a collection of herbicides to achieve broad
spectrum weed control. 29 Additionally, Roundup weed control
programs can be easily integrated with other current farming
trends, such as post-emergence weed control, adoption of
conservation tillage practices and narrow row spacing.30
The Roundup Ready soybean is covered by two patents. The
first patent discloses the insertion of a synthetic gene consisting of
a promoter, a protein sequence of interest, and a stop signal into
plant DNA to create resistance to herbicide." The second patent
discloses the gene that encodes a modified enzyme that is
necessary for plant growth, the isolated DNA molecule encoding
it, the glyphosate-tolerant plant cell with that DNA molecule, a
transgenic soybean plant, and a method of producing genetically
transformed plants that are resistant to glyphosate herbicide.3 2 The
combination of these two patents involves the insertion of a

29. Id. To illustrate the complexity of pre-Roundup weed control systems,
in 1994, the average number of active ingredients from different herbicides per
acre was 2.7 and 21% of soybean acreage was treated with four or more active
ingredients. Id.
30. Id. To briefly explain these emerging farming techniques, post-emergent
herbicides treat weeds that have already emerged, as opposed to controlling
weeds from emerging. Post Emergent Weed Controls, LANDSCAPE AMERICA,
www.landscape-america.com/problems/weeds/postemerge.html
(last visited
Oct. 20, 2013). Conservation tillage is a method of soil cultivation that leaves
the previous crop's residue on fields when planting the next crop, and reduces
soil erosion and runoff. Conservation Tillage, MINN. DEPT. OF AGRIC.,
www.mda.state.mn.us/protecting/conservation/practices/constillage.aspx
(last
visited Oct. 20, 2013). Finally, planting soybeans in narrower row spacing has
been shown to have yield advantages over wider row spacing. Palle Pederson,
Row
Spacing
in
Soybean,
IOWA
STATE
UNIV.,
www.extension.agron.iastate.edu/soybean/documents/RowSpacing.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 20, 2013).
31. Savich, supra note 20, at 118; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (filed
Oct. 28, 1993).
32. Savich, supra note 20, at 118; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,633,435 (filed
Sept. 13, 1994). The glyphosate in Roundup inhibits the metabolic activity of
the enzyme 5-enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate synthase ("EPSPS"), which
converts sugars into amino acids needed for plant growth. Savich, supra note
20, at 118.
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modified enzyme gene into crop seed to confer glyphosateresistance to plants grown using the seed.33
2. Licensing Scheme
Monsanto employs a two-tiered licensing scheme to distribute
Roundup Ready. First, Monsanto licenses the patented genes to
other seed companies. Under this first tier of Monsanto's licensing
scheme, the seed companies may not sell seed to a seed grower
without the grower first signing a license agreement.34
Additionally, the seed sold can only be used by growers for a
single commercial crop. Those seed companies then manufacture
glyphosate-tolerant seeds by incorporating Monsanto's patented
traits into their own germplasm, and license the seeds to their own
customers under a technology agreement." The seed companies to
whom Monsanto licenses the patented genes in this first tier often
do not have the financial resources to develop their own GE
traits."
Under the second tier of Monsanto's licensing scheme, the
restrictions on the seed grower, often a farmer, include: (1) the
aforementioned single commercial crop restriction, (2) the
prohibition against saving the seed containing the biotechnology
for replanting, (3) the prohibition against research or
experimentation, and (4) the payment of a technology fee.
Effectively, the technology agreements that Monsanto requires

33. Savich, supra note 20, at 118. Thus, the glyphosate will inhibit the
metabolic activity of the modified EPSPS in the soybean seeds. Id.
34. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG'G, supra note 12, at
19.
38. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333. The technology agreements incorporate
Monsanto's Technology Use Guide by reference, which Monsanto revises
annually. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 1, at 22. The
Guide contains an extensive amount of use restrictions that are not listed here.
Id. The Guide is a 31-page supplement to the technology agreements, and
farmers are responsible for strictly following the rules and restrictions contained
within. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, MONSANTO V. U.S. FARMERS 17 (2005).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol24/iss1/4
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farmers to sign ensure that farmers have to pay for new seed on an
annual basis.39 Monsanto was the first company to require farmers
to sign such technology and stewardship agreements, but other
companies now follow its model.40
Under these technology agreements, farmers are merely "users"
of Monsanto's patented traits.4' Monsanto remains the owner of
the patented genetic trait and rents the trait inside the seed to the
farmers.42 The controversial agreements encountered a lot of
resistance from farmers who saved seed for replanting, because of
how common-place the practice was.43 However, Monsanto saw
those farmers as "affect[ing] competitive conditions.""
3. Monsanto-FarmerLitigation
In addition to its licensing scheme, Monsanto prosecutes U.S.
farmers for patent infringement and violation of their technology
agreements. Since 1997, shortly after Roundup Ready seeds were
first commercialized, Monsanto has filed 145 suits against farmers
in the United States.45 Eleven of these lawsuits have proceeded
through trial, and each case was found "in Monsanto's favor"
Of these lawsuits, 72 awarded
(according to Monsanto).46
publicly-recorded damages to Monsanto, 27 awarded unrecorded
39. Tempe Smith, Going to Seed?: Using Monsanto as a Case Study to
Examine the Patent and Antitrust Implications of the Sale and Use of
Genetically Modified Seeds, 61 ALA. L. REV. 629, 631-32 (2010).
40. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 1, at 22.
DuPont/Pioneer Hi-Bred's Terms and Conditions of Purchase also specify that
buyers of its patented seed can only purchase it for a single crop and explicitly
forbids any seed saving, breeding, or research. Id. at 25.
41.

MARIE-MONIQUE

ROBIN,

WORLD ACCORDING TO MONSANTO

206

(2010).
42. Id. at 205-06.
43. Id. 205
44. Id. at 204.
45.
Saved
Seed
and
Farmer
Lawsuits,
MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/saved-seed-farmer-lawsuits.aspx
(last visited May 3, 2013). Monsanto admits that "[t]his may sound like a lot,
but when you consider that we sell seed to more than 250,000 American farmers
a year, it's really a small number." Id.
46.

MONSANTO, supra note 45.
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damages to Monsanto (in confidential settlements), 14 were
dismissed with no indication of damages awarded to Monsanto,
and eleven are still ongoing as of November 28, 2012.47
The economic impact of Monsanto's litigation is evident
through each stage of Monsanto's efforts to prosecute farmers:
and
litigation.48
settlements,
out-of-court
investigation,
Monsanto's "investigation department," as of 2003, had 75
employees and a budget of $10 million.49 This department, as
estimated from press reports, investigates approximately 500
farmers each year.o Under the technology use agreements signed
by the farmers, Monsanto is explicitly allowed to examine
subsequent crops to make sure each farmer is not growing
Monsanto seed illegally.5 1 Personal accounts from farmers sued by
Monsanto reveal that agents hired by Monsanto would "knock[] on
their door, sometimes accompanied by the police."5 2 The agents
go into the farmers' fields and take plant samples and
photographs. 3
From the above-mentioned publicly recorded damages,
Monsanto was awarded $23,675,820.99, with judgments ranging
from $5,595.00 to $3,052,800.00.54 However, "[t]he vast majority
of cases filed by Monsanto against farmers have been settled

47. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 1, at 30.
48. Id. at 27.
49. Id. As with the technology use agreements, other companies have
followed Monsanto's lead in investigating farmers. For example, DuPont hired
approximately 35 investigators in 2013 to examine planting and purchasing
records of U.S. farmers, and to take samples of their fields for genetic analysis.
Id.
50. Id at 30 (citing n.27).
51.

ALAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORA'S PICNIC BASKET 249 (2000).

52.

ROBIN, supra note 41, at 208.

53. Id at 208. Other investigative techniques include an anonymous tollfree number, 1-800-ROUNDUP, for farmers to report other farmers. Id. This
tip line received 1500 tips in just 1999, which many criticize as "fraying the
social fabric" of farming communities. Id.
54. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 1, at 30.
However, these reported figures may be lower than actual damages paid because
they may not include, for example, expert witness fees, post judgment interest,
plaintiff's attorney fees, or costs of testing fields. Id.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol24/iss1/4
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before any extensive litigation [took] place." 5 ' The Center for
Food Safety, in 2006, estimated that Monsanto had instituted from
2,000 to 5,000 "seed piracy matters" against farmers." They then
estimated that Monsanto was paid an estimated $85,653,601 to
$160,594,230 in out-of-court settlements."
C. History ofPatentProtectionof Seeds
In order to understand how Monsanto's utility patents are
leading to a dangerous loss of biodiversity, it is important to
understand the evolution of seed patent protection. In the
beginning of the U.S. Patent System, it was widely accepted that
plants could not be "owned" via patent protection, even for a
limited patent term." However, plant life can now be protected by
three mechanisms: (1) a plant patent via the Plant Patent Act, (2) a
plant Certificate of Protection via the Plant Variety Protection Act,
or (3) a § 101 utility patent.
1. PlantPatent Act of 1930
With increasing profits in the seed industry, plant breeders
rallied for protection of seed varieties." Shortly after the Hi-Bred
Corn Company marketed the first hybrid seed corn in 1926,
Congress passed the Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act of 1930
(PPA).60 The PPA granted intellectual property rights to breeders
for any "asexually reproduced . . . distinct and new variety of

plant, other than a tuber-propagated [sic] plant," rejecting the
patentability of sexually reproducing plants."1 This act gave
55. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, No. 04:00CV84, 2005 WL 1490051, at *5
(E.D. Mo. June 23, 2005).
56. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 1, at 30.
57. Id.
58.

PETER PRINGLE, FOOD, INC. 87 (2003).

59. Id. at 87-88.
60. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Patents, Genetically Modified Foods, and IP
Overreaching,64 SMU L. REV. 859, 863-64 (2011).
61.

Id. at 864 (quoting 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS

§

24.02(1) (2010)) The PPA defined "asexual reproduction" as reproduction "by
means other than from seeds, such as by the rooting of cuttings, by layering,
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breeders, for the first time, patent-like protection and incentives.6 2
However, Congress was reluctant to give breeders intellectual
property protection over staple food crops such as potatoes, which
were specifically excluded under the act. Congress believed that
private sector companies could not be trusted with monopoly
control over the food supply with intellectual property protection."6
Plant patents, thus, provided a narrow form of protection that
protected novel and distinct asexual plants from direct copying. 5
2. Plant Variety ProtectionAct of 1970
Breeders still demanded more intellectual property protection,
and after the International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants created an international plant patent-like
protection system in 1961, Congress passed a similar law in the
United States. The Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), enacted
by Congress in 1970, expanded intellectual property protection
available to breeders of novel sexually reproduced or tuber

budding, in-arching, etc." Id. The exclusion of sexually reproducing plants is
significant because it denied protection to the majority of food-producing plants
that reproduced via seeds. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra
note 1, at 4.
62. Rowe, supra note 60, at 864.
63. PRINGLE, supra note 58, at 88.
64. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 1, at 4.
65. Paul J. Heald & Susannah Chapman, Veggie Tales: Pernicious Myths
About Patents,Innovation, and Crop Diversity in the Twentieth Century, 2012
U. ILL. L. REv. 1051, 1057 (2012). The plants protected by the PPA do not
reproduce "true-to-type," as opposed to soybeans. Id. Therefore, a competitor
could only misappropriate a protected variety by stealing a cutting from a new
tree. Id Saving seeds from a new tree and replanting them would be
ineffective, because each seed will grow into a different tree genetically. Id.
66. PRINGLE, supra note 58, at 88-89. The International Convention for the
Protection of New Varieties and Plants permitted other breeders to use protected
varieties as source material for their breeding programs, and farmers were
allowed to save seeds for replanting. Id. at 88. This system was a compromise
between breeder's need for intellectual property protection and the fear of
allowing patents on plants could lead to monopolies and would increase the
price of food. Id.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol24/iss1/4
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propagated plant varieties. 7 Plant developers were required to
prove that their new variety was novel, genetically uniform, and
stable through successful generations." Exclusive rights were
available via a plant variety certificate issued by the USDA, as
opposed to the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO).6 9 The certificates gave exclusive marketing rights to
breeders for an 18-year terms.
Most important to seed growers and farmers, however, were the
two new exemptions not contained in the PPA. First, there was a
crop exemption, which allowed for crops to be grown from
protected varieties to be sold as food, feed, fiber, and other
nonreproductive purposes.7 ' The crop exemption also allowed
farmers to save seed produced from protected varieties to replant
the next farm season.72 Second, the PVPA also contained a
research exemption, in which the use and reproduction of a
protected variety for plant breeding or other research was not
infringement of PVPA exclusive rights."
3. Diamond v. Chakrabarty
While some argued that the enactments of PPA and PVPA
reflected a Congressional understanding to exclude living things
from "manufacture" or "composition of matter" for utility patents,
the Supreme Court rejected that view in 1980 in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty.74 The patent applicant, Ananda Chakrabarty, filed an
application for a bacterium to soak up oil spills that was rejected
67. Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 and 28 U.S.C.).
68. FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG'G, supra note 12, at
43.
69. Rowe, supra note 60, at 864.
70.

CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 1, at 4.

71. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2006).
72. Id. However, this exception was later limited to saving seeds only for
personal use. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 185 (1995).
Any farmer who sold saved seeds that were protected by the PVPA to neighbors
would violate the PVPA. Id.
73. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2006).
74. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311 (1980).
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by the USPTO." The application was rejected on the grounds that
living things were not patentable by § 101 utility patents.76 The
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the examiner, upheld by
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, and found that Chakrabarty's
bacterium was patentable subject matter." The Supreme Court
held that the living, human-made bacterium "was [§ 101]
patentable subject matter because (1) it was a product of creative
human agency containing characteristics 'markedly different' from
those found in nature, and (2) it possessed potential for significant
utility."" Diamond v. Chakrabarty, thus, marked a massive seachange in the patentability of seeds.
4. Exparte Hibberd
Even after Chakrabarty, breeders did not immediately rush to
file utility patents for their plants because of their existing rights
under the PPA and PVPA.7 9 Additionally, despite the Court's
ruling in Chakrabarty, the USPTO still debated whether utility
patents could cover sexually reproducing plants."o Plant breeders
still continued to avail themselves of their rights under the PPA
and PVPA. 1 This changed, however, in 1985 when the USPTO
granted a series of patents on a new line of corn in Ex parte
Hibberd.8 2 The patentee was granted patents on the tissue culture,
This ruling was a marked
the seed, and the whole plant."
expansion from the rights a breeder would enjoy under the PPA or
PVPA: a single claim for a new plant variety.84 The Hibberd
ruling gave plant breeders an incentive to use utility patent
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 305.
Id.
Id. at 310.
Rowe, supra note 60, at 862.

79.

PRINGLE, supra note 58, at 91.

80. Rowe, supra note 60, at 865 (citing Ex parte Hibberd, No. 645-91. 227
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444 (B.P.A.I. 1985)).
81.

PRINGLE, supra note 58, at 91.

82. Rowe, supra note 60, at 865 (citing Hibberd,227 U.S.P.Q. at 443).
83.

PRINGLE, supra note 58, at 91.

84. Id.
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protection because the utility patent would cover the process of
creating the variety and the product." A utility patent would cover
the DNA sequences, genes, cells, tissue cultures, seed, specific
plant parts, and the entire plant." Additionally, a utility seed
patent did not incorporate the crop exemption in the PVPA and
denied farmers the right to save and replant seeds." The Supreme
Court subsequently affirmed USPTO practice in 2001 in JE.M
Ag. Supply v. PioneerHi-Bred International,which upheld utility
patent protection for plants."
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MONSANTO'S POWER

With the ability to receive advantageous utility patent protection
for seeds, the seed industry quickly responded by filing large
amounts of applications.
Utility patents caused a major
restructuring of the seed industry, with strategic mergers and
acquisitions. As a result, the companies that survived the
consolidation movement now own large market shares, to the
detriment of the seed industry's competitive nature. Farmers,
therefore, are effectively denied the ability to choose any seed
other than Monsanto's industry leader, and are then required to
sign Monsanto's technology use agreements. As prohibited by the
agreement, the farmers cannot save seeds for replanting and must
buy new seeds annually. The net effect of the consolidation of the
seed industry and farmers' inability to save seeds has led to a
decrease in genetic diversity. This loss of diversity has had severe
consequences due to a loss of resistance towards diseases and
pests.
A. Effect of Utility Patents
After Hibberd, the number of patent applications dramatically

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing

JACK RALPH KLOPPENBERG, FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY 267 (1988)).
88. J.E.M. Ag. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127

(2001).
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rose, with the industry in a "global race against time to assure [its]
eminence in biotechnology."" The life patent "floodgate" was
open. In the time period between 1983 and 2005, Monsanto was
granted 647 patents.90 The USPTO was granting broad patents that
gave patentees the ability to exclude others from using key
techniques useful in genetically engineering plants.9 ' For example,
the USPTO granted patents on components such as genes, gene
fragments and sequences, cell lines, human proteins, and naturally
occurring compounds-that sometimes even covered non-GE
properties.92 To illustrate these broad patents, critics point out that
a soybean plant has over 46,000 genes that give plants several nonGE properties.9 3 However, seed firms could often receive patent
rights to the entire plant by adding one genetic trait, broadly
covering all of the plant's GE and non-GE properties.94 These
broad patents sometimes even covered "all genetically engineered
soybeans."" Patents were occasionally granted on discoveries,
such as a therapeutic use for the Indian neem tree.96 The patentee
described the tree, isolated the tree from its natural context, and
filed a patent application:
"the deciding factor is that the
description be done in a laboratory, and no attention is paid to the
fact that the plant and its virtues have been known for thousands of
years.""
Additionally, Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980,
which allowed university researchers to retain title on patents on

89. PRINGLE, supra note 58, at 91-93 (citing Mark Sagoff, PatentedGenes:
An Ethical Appraisal, ISSUES IN SCIENCE & TECH. ONLINE (Spring 1998),
http://www.nap.edu/issues/14.3/sagoff.htm).
90. ROBIN, supra note 41, at 203.
91. PRINGLE, supra note 58, at 92.
92. Id. (citing Sagoff, supra note 89).
93. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 1, at 16.
94. Id. Examples of non-GE properties include yield potential, seed size,
time to maturity, various seed qualities, disease resistance, drought tolerance,
and adaptations to particular soils and climates. Id. These properties are
product of plant breeding, for example through saving seed. Id.; see also supra
Part II.A.
95. PRINGLE, supra note 58, at 94.
96. ROBIN, supra note 41, at 203.
97. Id. (quoting Christoph Then, the Greenpeace representative in Munich).
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federally supported inventions.9 8 This act expanded the class of
possible patentees, and university researchers began to negotiate
"one-on-one deals with corporations."99 Critics of the Bayh-Dole
Act argued that it would have a chilling effect on publicly funded
agricultural research: researchers who used to freely exchange
their scientific findings would now take their patent rights into
account first.'oo Historically, public universities contributed most
of the conventional seed supply for major field crops.' However,
due to the Bayh-Dole Act, these public universities have become
dependent on biotech companies for funding and have distorted
their research goals to serve the industry rather than the farmers.102
Therefore, the Bayh-Dole Act also had a chilling effect on the
conventional seed supply.'03
B. Seed Market Consolidation
After the advent of seed utility patents, the seed industry quickly
began to consolidate. Many of the acquisitions by major seed
companies were for the sole purpose of acquiring patent
portfolios.'" Between 1995 and 1998, Monsanto, DuPont and
Novartis spent $30 billion on acquiring other seed companies.'o
Between 1996 and 2009, at least 200 independent seed companies
were acquired.'06 In particular, Monsanto spent $4.81 billion
98. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006).
99.

PRINGLE, supra note 58, at 92.

100. Id.
101.

FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG'G, supra note 12, at

50.
102. Id From the time the Act passed to 2006, industry supported research
increased by 8% annually. ORGANIC SEED ALLIANCE, STATE OF ORGANIC SEED

8(2011).
103.

ORGANIC SEED ALLIANCE, supra note 102, at 37.

104. PRINGLE, supra note 58, at 93. "One company was created solely for
the purpose of 'buying up broad patents and then suing other companies for
alleged infringements."' Id. (citing W. Lambert & A.S. Hayes, Investing in
Patents to FileSuits is Curbed,WALL ST. J., May 30, 1990).
105. Id.
106.

CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 1, at 15 (citing

Philip H. Howard, Visualizing Consolidation in the GlobalSeed Industry: 19962008, 1 SUSTAINABILITY 1266 (2009)).
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between 2005 and 2009 to acquire other seed firms.' 7 From 1996
(when Roundup Ready soybeans were first commercialized) to
today, Monsanto acquired at least thirty other seed companies for
$12 billion.'0 o
The increasing concentration of the seed industry has effectively
In 2004, ten companies
eliminated competitive conditions.
09
However, today, the same
sales.'
controlled half of global seed
ten companies control nearly three quarters of global seed sales."o
Furthermore, as of 2008, the top four firms (Monsanto,
DuPont/Pioneer Hi-Bred, Syngneta, and Bayer CropScience)
accounted for 43% of the global commercial seed market."' When
the concentration ratio of the top four firms in an industry is 40%
or more, economists say that the industry has lost its competitive
character.12
Monsanto is the number one seed firm, after its series of
acquisitions, mergers, and partnerships with its competitors."' In
the soybean seed market, Monsanto controls nearly 30% directly
through seed sales.' 14 However, this number is closer to 60% when
one considers Monsanto's ownership of the genetic traits that it
licenses to other seed companies through the first tier of its
licensing scheme."' As a result, Roundup Ready soybeans are
107. Id. at 17.
108. Lina Khan, How Monsanto Outfoxed the Obama Administration,
SALON

15,

(Mar.

2013),

http://www.salon.com/2013/03/15/how-did-monsanto-outfoxtheobamaadm
inistration/.
109. Lappd, supra note 5.
110. Id.
111. FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG'G, supra note 12, at
13 fig. 1. This number includes both public and proprietary varieties sold.
112. Id. (citing U.S. SENATE, DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE COMMITTEE ON
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE SECTOR: TRENDS,

CONSEQUENCES

AND

POLICY

OPTIONS

(2004),

available

at

http://www.sraproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2007/12/harkinconcentrationwhitepaper.pdf).
113. Id. at 16.
114. Id. at 18.
115. Id. (citing Supplemental Toolkit for Investors, MONSANTO (Feb. 2010),
http://www.monsanto.com/investors/documents/supplemental-toolkit.pdf).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol24/iss1/4

18

Martin: Seed Savers v. Monsanto: Farmers Need a Victory for Wilting Biodi

2013]

FARMERS NEED A VICTORY

113

grown on 93% of soybean acreage in the United States." 6
C. Lack ofFarmer Choice
The consolidation of the seed industry has decreased the number
of firms in the seed industry, and has effectively prevented farmers
from being able to choose which seeds to plant. Monsanto argues
that farmers have the option to not purchase biotech seeds from
Monsanto or any other firm, and identifies three other available
options to farmers."'
First, farmers could purchase organic
seeds."' Second, farmers could choose to purchase, conventional,
non-organic seed." 9 Finally, farmers could purchase biotech seeds
from a company other than Monsanto.'20 However, these options
are increasingly less available to farmers.
First of all, with the consolidation of the seed industry,
independent seed companies are dying out. Large seed companies
have bought out many smaller seed companies to acquire their
germplasm and breeding programs.' 2 '
As the Independent
Professional Seed Association estimates, there were approximately
300 independent and consolidated companies in 2000.122 Of those
300, only 100 independent seed companies remain.123 While many
of those independent seed companies were acquired in the
consolidation of the industry, others have gone bankrupt.'24

116. Brief for American Soybean Association, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Bowman v. Monsanto, Co., No. 11-796 (2013), 2013
WL 315223, at *8.
117.
Monsanto, the Government, Monopoly Claims, MONSANTO,
www.monsanto.com/food-inc/Pages/monsanto-revolving-door.aspx (last visited
May 4, 2013).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG'G, supra note 12, at
16.
122. Id. at 28. The Independent Professional Seed Association launched a
campaign to increase the viability of these remaining seed companies, but after
only a year, twenty five more seed companies had gone out of business. Id.
123. Id.
124. Khan, supra note 108.
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Therefore, non-GE soybeans are increasingly unavailable in the
marketplace. As one farmer explains, "[i]f you want to raise ... a
non-GMO soybean ... you better get your seed needs locked in far
in advance or you may not be able to secure your needs."l 25 To
illustrate this, one can look at conventional seeds' renewed
demand and the inability of seed producers to meet that demand.
In 2009, there was a reduction in GE soybean acreage planted, and
some reported that conventional soybean sales had doubled.126
However, there were conventional soybean shortages reported in
Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio.127 Furthermore, it was
estimated that if, in Mississippi, all of the available conventional
seed was planted, it would only total 3% of the state's soybean
acreage.' 28 Similarly, for organic seeds, many private companies
are unwilling to invest in the time and money required to create
new and improved organic varieties.129 As a result, organic
farmers cannot access quality certified organic seed.'30
Finally, Monsanto identifies other companies that develop
genetic traits, such as DuPont, Syngenta, and Dow, who can sell
seeds to farmers who do not want to purchase them from
Monsanto."'
However, while Monsanto has been the most
aggressive with licensing and litigation, other agricultural
companies have followed its lead.' 32 Therefore, these seeds with
other genetic traits will still restrict farmers from seed saving.
Additionally, Monsanto's confidential licensing arrangements with
seed dealers are alleged to contain clauses that restrict seed
dealers' selection and marketing of Monsanto's competitors'
genetic traits, further adversely affecting the availability of nonMonsanto seeds.
For example, Monsanto's contracts with
independent seed distributors sometimes contractually obligate the
125. FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG'G, supra note 12, at
26-27.
126. Id. at 35.
127. Id.
128. Id. Additionally, if only the available public varieties were planted, it
would only total to 0.5% of the state's soybean acreage. Id.
129.

ORGANIC SEED ALLIANCE, supra note 102, at 15.

130. Id. at 38.
131. MONSANTO, supra note 117.
132. See supra notes 40, 49 and accompanying text.
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distributor to carry only certain seeds, or give a steep discount if
Monsanto's products comprise a certain proportion of the
distributor's inventory."' Some licensing agreements condition
the license of soybean seed on the acceptance of a "bundling
agreement[] that financially penalize[s] seed companies for selling
less than a minimum percentage of seed containing Monsanto

traits." 3 4
Furthermore, Monsanto cross-licenses the Roundup Ready traits
to 200 other seed companies, "creating the fiction of
competition." 35
Monsanto has restrictive cross-licensing
arrangements with many of its competitors, such as Syngenta,
Dow AgroSciences LLC, Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc., and
Bayer CropScience.' 36 Many of the cross-licensing arrangements
result from settlement of litigation: because of the overwhelming
popularity of the Roundup pesticide, many companies fear being
denied access to Monsanto's technology and agree to withdraw
antitrust and infringement cases in exchange for cross-licensing
arrangements. '"

Similar to farmers, competitors often accept

highly restrictive license agreement language because "the nature
of the industry requires competitors to cross-license in order to
access prime seed lines and distribution relationships." 3 8

133. Elizabeth Winston, A Patent Misperception, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 289, 303 (2012). Furthermore, Monsanto reserves the right to cancel a
deal and wipe out the inventory of an independent seed company that violates
the terms of its licensing agreement. Christopher Leonard, Monsanto Stomps
Down Budding Seed Competitors, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 2009, 10:51 AM,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2009-12-14-monsantopractices N.htm.
134. Winston, supra note 133, at 323.
135. Id. at 305. Cross licensing and other private ordering amongst seed
industry competitors is accomplished through a variety of techniques, such as
joint venture agreements "that restrict the licensing of one partner's technology
outside the agreement, thus impeding rivals' access to that technology for the
purposes of developing competing products." Id. at 322.
136. Id. at 306 n.108.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 322.
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D. Decrease in Seed Saving
As discussed above, Monsanto views seed saving as adversely
affecting competition. Historically, the amount of seeds that
farmers saved used to constrain the pricing freedom of new seed
producers.'" To prevent seed saving, as previously discussed,
Monsanto's farmer technology agreements bind farmers to buy
new seed for the next year. Assuming that these farmers actually
abide by these agreements,' 4 0 it follows that farmers planting
Monsanto seeds do not save their seed for replanting the following
season. Between the years of 1986 and 1995, on average 72% of
land was planted with purchased seed.' 4 ' In 1996 and 1997, that
percentage rose to 76% and 81%, respectively. 4 2 By 2000, 83.9%
of soybean acreage planted was from purchased seeds, meaning
that only 16.1% of soybean acreage planted was from saved
seeds. 4 3 Finally, "[tioday nearly all the soybeans planted are
patented varieties with seed saving restrictions.""
E. Decreasein VarietalDiversity
By prohibiting farmers from saving seeds, agriculture is losing

139. Brief for American Antitrust Institute, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Bowman v. Monsanto, Co., No. 11-796 (2012), 2012
WL 6208274 at *28.
140. Regardless of what the technology agreement binds farmer to do and to
not do, many farmers do not understand that they are not supposed to save
Monsanto's seed. Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Monsanto's Harvest of
2008,
1,
May
FAIR,
VANITY
Fear,
2

http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/05/monsanto 00805.
141. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERV., AIB-786, THE
SEED INDUSTRY IN U.S. AGRICULTURE 11 (Jan. 2004), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/260729/aib786_1_.pdf.

142. Id.
143. Brief for the Office of the Attorney General for Mississippi as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Scruggs v. Monsanto Co., 549 U.S. 1342

(2007) (No. 06-1205), 2007 WL 1050187, at *18.
144. FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG'G, supra note 12, at
12 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERV., ADOPTION OF
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS IN THE U.S. (2009)).
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each farmer's contribution to the preservation of genetic variety.'4 5
Furthermore, the consolidation of the seed industry (spurred by
utility patents) has eroded the genetic diversity of crops. The
combination of these two losses has led to an actual decrease in
varietal diversity, as feared by agricultural organizations. In 1968,
the USDA opposed an amendment to the PPA that would extend
plant patents to include sexually reproduced plants. 4 6 The USDA
opposed the amendment on the grounds that plant patents would
threaten the development and introduction of new seed varieties.14 7
Unfortunately, data showing the loss of plant varieties throughout
the last century have confirmed the negative effects of Monsanto's
practices.
As seen above, the amount of seeds saved by farmers has
decreased since the commercialization of Roundup Ready. Each
year, farmers that license Monsanto's patented traits must purchase
new seed and are prohibited from saving any of the seeds.
Therefore, traditional farming practices, such as phenotypic
selection of seeds from healthy and productive plants and crossbreeding of desirable traits, are no longer happening when farmers
license Roundup Ready seeds. As Roundup Ready soybeans
account for 93% of soybean acreage in the U.S., farmers cannot
create new genetically distinct varieties from saved seed.
Additionally, the loss of independent seed companies has led to
a decrease in variety. Many of the disappearing independent seed
companies discussed above bred seeds suited for their regional
customers.'4 8 However, as these independent companies were
either acquired or driven to bankruptcy, large companies such as
Monsanto, acquired their germplasm. Unlike regional breeding
companies, Monsanto does not produce seed for specific areas;
instead, Monsanto's products need to be broadly adapted to be sold
over a large geographic area.'49 As a result, "[m]odern agriculture

145. See supra Part II.A, for an explanation of how farmers create
genetically distinct varieties through seed saving.
146. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 1, at 9.
147. Id.
148.

FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG'G, supra note 12, at

28.
149. Id.
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is dependent upon a relatively small number of commercial crop
species, some of which are dominated by a relatively small number
of varieties within the species."5 o
While academic research has focused on varietal diversity, it is a
useful proxy to show genetic diversity. From 1904 to 2004, 94%
of the seed varieties available in 1903 were no longer available in
2004 seed catalogs, showing a 6% variety survival rate.' 51
Researchers, however, also find that the diversity of commercially
available varieties did not decrease in that period. 5 2 There were
7262 commercially available varieties in 1903, and 7100 in 2004.
These numbers remained steady due to "varietal replacement:" the
introduction of new varieties, and the reintroduction of improved
varieties and heirlooms to the market.'15 In spite of data showing
stability in commercially available crops, certain crops have
suffered notable losses. For a specific example of a notable loss of
variety, the United States has lost 6000 of 7000 apple varieties that

were previously grown.15 4
IV. "PLAGUE OFSAMENESS": BIODIVERSITY CONSEQUENCES

Many describe the increasing genetic uniformity as a "plague of
sameness," overtaking vast fields of crops with monoculture
agriculture.'16 The economic effect of this "plague of sameness" is
enormous: "pest[] and plant diseases are . . . estimated to exact a
150. Brief for the American Corn Growers Association & National Farmers
Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (No. 99-1996), 2001 WL
490944 at *14.
151.

JANISSE RAY, THE SEED UNDERGROUND 6 (2012). The study discussed

focused on forty-two vegetable crop species, comparing commercial catalogs
from the National Agriculture Library. Heald & Chapman, supra note 65, at
1062-63. The researchers tracked which varieties of plants marketed in 1901
and 1902 were still being marketed in 2004, and also compared the absolute
number of varieties of each crop conunercially available from 1901 and 1902 to
2004. Id. at 1064.
152. Heald & Chapman, supra note 65, at 1072-73.
153. RAY, supra note 151, at 6.
154. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 1, at 9.
155. PRINGLE, supra note 58, at 14.
156. Id.
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However, the
toll of $20-33 billion each year nationwide."'
dangers of this plague are not limited to economic concerns.
When crops are threatened by pests or disease, genetically uniform
crops could be wiped out. Without the ability to locate genetic
resistance in any varieties, the world could lose entire major food
crops, such as soybeans, corn, rice, and wheat.
A. Genetic Resistance
According to Cary Fowler and Pat Mooney, "today's plant
breeder will search for one major gene to confer resistance for the
new variety."'

One-gene resistance provides that there will be

only "one line of defense" against pests and diseases.'59 When
overcome by pest or disease, the gene can no longer provide
resistance. 6 0 Breeding, then, is a "step by step evasion of the
pathogen," and the use of one-gene resistance lacks an "ultimate
vision of permanent or stabilized resistance."' 6 ' In contrast, the
traditional "landrace" confers resistance on a new variety as the
product of a large number of genes working together.'6 2 The
resistance conferred by the traditional "landrace" is long-lasting,
because these varieties have survived among pests and diseases "in
the center of diversity."' 3
Additionally, heirloom varieties,
discussed above, are used to breed insect, disease, and drought
tolerance into modern crops.'" In contrast to the conventional
157.

CALVIN

0. QUALSET & HENRY

L.

SHANDS,

GENETIC

RES.

CONSERVATION PROGRAM UNIV. OF CAL., SAFEGUARDING THE FUTURE OF U.S.
AGRICULTURE
7
(2005),
available
at

http://ucce.ucdavis.edulfiles/repositoryfiles/safeguardingfutureusag-54956.pdf.
158. FOWLER & MOONEY supra note 10, at 81.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 82.
161. Id
162. Id.
163. Id. at 81.
164.
Saving
Heirlooms,
SEED
SAVERS
EXCH.,
www.seedsavers.org/Education/Saving-Heirlooms (last visited May 5, 2013).
Landraces differ from heirloom seeds in that heirloom varieties are selectively
bred by farmers or plant breeders, whereas landraces develop solely to natural
processes. However, many heirloom varieties have evolved from landraces.
PRINGLE, supra note 58, at 22.
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three- or four-way hybrid varieties, GE varieties, such as Roundup
Ready soybeans, are "single-cross hybrids."1 65
The "plague of sameness" becomes even riskier when farmers
plant pure line varieties instead of a mixture of varieties, or where
a "few successful crop varieties replace the great diversity of crop
and types found in farmers' fields." 66 Monoculture agriculture is
prominent in developed countries,'16 largely because of the
predictability that single cross varieties offer farmers and the
agricultural industry.16 1
With this monoculture agriculture,
however, when part of the uniform crop is wiped out by pests or
diseases, the entire crop is wiped out.'69 Furthermore, when the
neighbor farmer plants the same variety, his crop is also wiped
Finally, "when virtually every farmer plants the same
out.'
variety or group of varieties, the risk becomes dangerous.""' The
lack of resistance and genetic variability leads to the vulnerability
of crops to pests and diseases.
B. Pest Management
First, the "plague of sameness," or monoculture agriculture,
threatens crop resistance to pests. Specifically, "[p]athogens or
insect pests that mutate to overcome a crop's innate resistance or
to escape the effects of fungicides or pesticides, together with
monoculture conditions, heighten the risk that such novel pests
could rapidly spread and cause great losses in crop yield and
quality."' 72 In recent years, the percentage of annual crop lost to
insects has doubled,'7 3 and global crop loss due to pests is an
165. FARMER To FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC
31.
166. QUALSET & SHANDS, supra note 157, at 7.
167. Id.
168. FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC
31.
169. FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 10, at 82.

ENG'G,

supra note 12, at

ENG'G,

supra note 12, at

170. Id.
171. Id. at 82-83 (emphasis added).
172. QUALSET & SHANDS, supra note 157, at vi.
173. FOWLER & MOONEY supra note 10, at 47 (citing Robert M. May &
Andrew P. Dobson, PopulationDynamics and the Rate ofEvolution ofPesticide
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estimated 30-40% of potential yield.'74 The rise of pest problems
is also evident through increased pesticide use: from 1945 to
1975, the amount of pesticide employed rose from less than 200
million pounds to 1600 million pounds.'75
Genetic mutations in these pathogens or pests require quick
replacement with varieties that have resistance. 76
These
replacements require the screening of gene resources to find new
resistance. 7 7 However, with a narrowing genetic resource base,
varieties that have resistance are slowly disappearing.
C. Vulnerability to Diseases
Second, monoculture agriculture increases vulnerability to
disease causing widespread damage. Two historical examples
show the dangers of monoculture agriculture in the face of disease.
Ireland's potato blight in 1846 that led to the Great Famine, was a
result of a lack of crop diversity."'7 The Irish were dependent on
the potato for food, and about 90% of the potatoes eaten were a
variety called "Lumper. "l79 When blight infected the potatoes, the
Lumper variety lacked resistance in the tubers.'" This lack of
resistance and the uniformity of the potatoes allowed the blight to
dramatically wipe out Ireland's potato supply. Potatoes "were the
first crop in modem history to be devastated by lack of
resistance.""' Not only were potatoes nearly lost as a major food
Resistance, in

PESTICIDE

RESISTANCE:

STRATEGIES

AND

TACTICS

FOR

MANAGEMENT 171 (1986)).
174. QUALSET & SHANDS, supra note 157, at 7.
175. FOWLER & MOONEY supra note 10, at 47 (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EPA-600/8-80-044,
SUMMARY: INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT 171 (1986)).

176.

RESEARCH

QUALSET & SHANDS, supra note 157, at 7.

177. Id at 7-8.
178. See generally Monoculture and the Irish Potato Famine: Cases of
Missing
Genetic
Variation,
UNDERSTANDING
EVOLUTION,
http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/agriculture_02 (last visited Oct.
4, 2013).
179.

FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 10, at 44; RAY, supra note 151 at 7.

180.

RAY, supra note 151, at 7.

181.

FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 10, at 45.

Fortunately, potato

resistance was in distinct types of potatoes in the Andes and Mexico. Id.
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crop, but 1 to 2 million Irish people died or left Ireland as a result

of the famine.18 2
In more recent history, the U.S. corn leaf blight of the 1970s
provides another example of the dangers of "monoculture"
agriculture. Similar to the uniformity of the Irish potato crop, in
1970, almost 85% of U.S. cornfields were planted with one corn
variety, Texas cytoplasmic male sterile.' This type of corn was
highly susceptible to a new type of fungus that wiped out 15% of
the corn crop and resulted in a $1 billion loss in the United
States.'84
While the U.S. hybrid corn industry only "[took] one year to
correct the problem and get resistant varieties back on the market,"
Fowler and Mooney point out that biodiversity crises such as these
One of the most troubling
raise many "unanswered questions."'
questions is: with such a narrow genetic base, will the seed
industry be able to find a quick solution the next time a crisis
occurs?' 86 A potential soybean "rust" crisis in 2004, with a disease
"that could ruin a field in two weeks, and . .. up to 80 percent of

yield," spurred plant scientists to screen seed samples in the USDA
Scientists identified some soybean
U.S. crop gene banks.'
varieties with weak resistance, but mostly found that none was
fully immune to the rust.' As a result, the scientists had to find
resistance in wild relatives of soybeans from China, Taiwan, and
Australia-countries where soybeans were first domesticated.' 89
The dangers of the "plague of sameness" show that crop

182. Id. at 45.
183. HistoricalPerspectives of Plant Diseases, AM. PHYTOPATHOLOGICAL
http://www.apsnet.org/edcenter/KSOC'v,
12/TeachersGuide/PlantBiotechnology/Pages/History.aspx (last visited May 5,
2013).
is Plant Pathology or Phytopathology?, AM.
184.
What
PHYTOPATHOLOGICAL

Soc'Y,

http://www.apsnet.org/edcenter/intropp/Documents/presentation.ppt (last visited
May 5, 2013).
185. FOWLER &MOONEY, supra note 10, at 83.
186. Id. at 84.
187. QUALSET & SHANDS, supra note 157, at 1.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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diversity needs to be preserved for future generations. The
Genetic Resources Conservation Program has found that "[n]early
every major U.S. food or fiber crop is battling pests and diseases
against which it has no resistance."'
Without resistant varieties
from a diverse genetic resource pool, future plant scientists will
not be able to locate or introduce resistance into modem crops. As
a result, "without these infusions of genetic diversity, food
production is at risk from epidemics and infestations.""' The Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has found that
the Earth's population will grow by 50% in the next fifty years;
thus, "crop diversity must be managed in a manner that promotes
productivity with reducing diversity." 92
V. CURRENT DOCTRINE HAS NOT, AND WILL NOT, PREVENT
Loss OF BIODIVERSITY

In light of this loss of biodiversity, however, Monsanto has been
victorious against farmers in district courts and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Courts have been focused on
whether the second generation of seeds are protected or whether
the patent right was exhausted by the sale. In Bowman v.
Monsanto, the latest Monsanto-farmer legal battle, the Supreme
Court restricted its analysis using the patent exhaustion doctrine,
holding that patent exhaustion does not permit a farmer to
reproduce patented seeds through planting and harvesting without
the patent holder's permission.'93 This precedent has not been, and
will continue to not be, effective in combating decreasing
biodiversity.
A. FederalCircuitPrecedent
Only two litigants against Monsanto have been able to progress
far enough in litigation to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of
190. Id. at 2.
191.

SEED SAVERS ExcH., supra note 164.

192. Zachary R.F. Schreiner, Comment, Frankenfuel: Genetically Modified
Corn, Ethanol, and Crop Diversity, 30 ENERGY L.J. 169, 172 (2009).
193. Bowman v. Monsanto, 133 S.Ct. 1761, 1763 (2013).
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certiorari.194 These two litigants, Homan McFarling and Mitchell
Scruggs, along with many other farmers sued by Monsanto, relied
on the patent exhaustion defense.' This doctrine provides that the
unrestricted first sale by a patentee of his patented article exhausts
his patent rights in the article. 96 However, the Federal Circuit has
held this defense inapplicable to McFarling and Scruggs, as well as
other farmers who saved patented seed in cases against
Monsanto.' 97 As discussed in Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, the
Federal Circuit found that there was no unrestricted sale because
the use of the seeds by seed growers was conditioned on obtaining
a license from Monsanto and new seeds grown from the original
batch via saved seeds had never been sold.'98 Just because the
patented seeds were self-replicating, and could be reproduced from
saved seeds, the Federal Circuit held, did not give farmers the right
to plant the second generation of seeds: "[a]pplying the first sale
doctrine to subsequent generations of self-replicating technology
would eviscerate the rights of the patent holder." 99
B. Bowman v. Monsanto Co.
The Supreme Court granted certiorarito the latest Monsantofarmer legal battle, Bowman v. Monsanto Co.200 Vernon H.
Bowman, the Indiana farmer at the center of the litigation,
purchased second generation seed from a grain elevator for his
second planting.20 ' Bowman saved seeds from that purchase for a
later planting.20 2 However, after examining his planting activities,
194. Smith, supra note 39, at 637.
195. Id.
196. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1335-36 (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart,
Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
197. Id. at 1336; Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
198. Id. at 1336.
199. Id.
200. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012).
201. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1763. For the "risky" second crop of the season,
Bowman purchased "commodity soybeans" from a grain elevator that were
meant for human or animal consumption. Id.
202. Id.
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Monsanto found that the second-planting crops from the grain
elevator seed contained Monsanto's patented technology. The
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Monsanto,"'
and the Federal Circuit affirmed.20
This case presented two questions to the Court for review: (1)
whether the first-sale doctrine grants the purchaser of a patented
article the right to make, use, and sell an unlimited number of new
copies of the patented invention that have never been sold, and (2)
whether patent law treats as per se unenforceable all restrictions
imposed by license on the use of a patented article following an
authorized sale.205 A unanimous Court held that an authorized sale
of a patented article does not allow the purchaser to make new
copies of the patented invention. 206
However, the Court focused
on whether Bowman infringed Monsanto's patents when he grew a
second generation of crops from saved seeds, and not on
Monsanto's "conditional sales." 207 Justice Sotomayor specifically
asked Monsanto's attorney in oral arguments whether the Court
even needed to address the "lingering confusion the Federal
Circuit may have with respect to conditional sales at all."208
Indeed, the Court did not address the Federal Circuit's conditional
sale doctrine in Bowman, leaving the resolution of the "lingering
confusion" to a later time.209

203. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 (S.D. Ind. 2009).
204. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
205. Brief for Respondent at i, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761
(2013) (No. 11-796).
206. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769.
207. Lawrence Hurley, Analysis: Top Court Unlikely to Decide Conditional
Sale Issue in Monsanto Case, THOMSON REUTERS, Feb. 21, 2013, available at
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2013/02 February/Analysis Top court unlikelyto decide conditional sale issue in
Monsanto case/.
208. Oral Argument, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796, 2013 WL
606035, at *49.
209. U.S. Supreme Court Monsanto Decision Leaves Patent Exhaustion
Questions About Self-Replicating Products Unanswered, KIRKLAND & ELLIS,
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/Alert_052813.pdf (last visited
Aug. 29, 2013).
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VI. PATENT MISUSE
Farmers could use patent misuse as a defense in infringement
Other solutions have been
actions brought by Monsanto.
suggested that are beyond the scope of this paper. 210 However, as
applied here, patent misuse would be only a limitation on
Monsanto's patent rights and their enforcement of those patents as
opposed to a per se rule of exhaustion of self-replicating
technologies 211 or unenforceable restrictions by patent licenses.
This section will first explore the defense and its application in the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, and will examine how the
defense has been unsuccessfully used against Monsanto. Finally,
this section will evaluate three different levels of applying patent
misuse rules to Monsanto's conduct, showing that farmers should
be able to successfully raise this defense.
A. Background
Patent misuse, an affirmative defense to patent infringement, is
an impermissible attempt to extend the time or scope of the patent
grant. 212 The policy of this equitable doctrine is "to prevent a
patentee from using the patent to obtain market benefit beyond that
which inheres in the statutory patent right." 213 Patent misuse is
directed at a patent's enforceability, not its validity. 214
Patent misuse is largely a judicial doctrine, with some statutory
210. These suggestions include legislative reforms, such as establishing the
Plant Variety Protection Act, with its seed saving exemption, as the sole
mechanism for patent protection for plants, or creating an analogous seed saving
exemption for utility patents. FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC
ENG'G, supra note 12, at 49. Other solutions include amendments to the BayhDole Act, rebuilding public plant breeding and public cultivar development
programs, removing the research restriction on licensing agreements, and
enacting "farmer protection" statutes that would protect farmers in patent
infringement litigation. Id. at 48-49.
211. The discussion of possible implications on other self-replicating
technologies is beyond the scope of this paper.
212. Robin Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent
Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 402 (2003).

213. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 704.
214. 1 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP. TR. & MONO. 4.57 (4th Ed. 2012).
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input. Congress has statutorily exempted five types of conduct
from patent misuse. 2 5 In enacting Section 271(d), Congress
wanted to confine the judicially-created patent misuse doctrine to
anticompetitive conduct by patentees who leverage their patents to
obtain economic advantages outside the legitimate scope of the
patent grant. 216 However, the application of patent misuse through
Supreme Court, Federal Circuit, and other lower court
jurisprudence has been less than straightforward. The Supreme
Court created the patent misuse doctrine in 1917 when responding
to rampant, unchecked monopolies.217 However, the Court has not
substantively returned to the doctrine since Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research Corp. in 1969.218

The Federal Circuit has characterized patent misuse as the
patentee's "impermissible broaden[ing] [of] the 'physical or
temporal scope' of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect." 2 19
Federal Circuit precedent has limited patent misuse to per se
antitrust and misuse specific practices.22 0 The latest Federal Circuit
decision addressing patent misuse, Princo Corp. v. ITC,
emphasized the narrow scope of the doctrine: "the defense . . . is

not available to a presumptive infringer simply because a patentee
engages in some kind of wrongful commercial conduct, even
215. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006).
216. Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing S.
REP. No. 100-492, at 9 (1988); 134 CONG. REC. 32,471 (1988) (statement of
Sen. Patrick Leahy)).
217. Vincent Chiappetta, Living with Patents:Insights from Patent Misuse,
15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (citing Motion Picture Patents Co.

v. Universal Film Mfg., Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)).
218. Id. (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Res., Inc., 395 U.S. 100
(1969)). Since Zenith, the Court discussed misuse in Blonder-Tongue Lab. V.
Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), but not about its substantive
application. Id. at 4 n.16. The Court has also discussed misuse in two other
cases noting misuse's evolution towards an antitrust net effects assessment. Id.
(citing Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Dawson
Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221-23 (1980)).
219. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1328 (citing Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc.
782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
220. Mallinckrodt,976 F.2d at 708. The Federal Circuit further rejected the
notion that cases such as Bauer and Motion Picture were limited to certain per
se violations. Id. at 708 n.8.
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conduct that may have competitive effects." 22 ' Factually, the
defendant must either show impermissible expansion through (1)
Supreme Court precedent that has specifically held the activity per
se misuse,222 or (2) a showing that the overall effect of a specific
action (such as a licensing arrangement) tends to restrain
competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined relevant
market. 2 23 However, the Federal Circuit is deferential to patent
owners' conditions on the sale of patented goods to restrict the
disposition of the goods by the purchasers.2 24
An ongoing debate exists with courts and commentators on the
need for the patent misuse doctrine.22 5 Some argue that the
doctrine has little utility since the development of modem antitrust
doctrine. 226 However, others support strengthening the defense.
Judge Dyk, dissenting in Princo, asserted that the majority opinion
"emasculated" patent misuse to make it a non-meaningful
defense. 227 This issue is ripe for the Supreme Court to revisit,
especially given that its recent decision in Quanta Computer, Inc.
v. LG Electronics, Inc. refrained from stating whether license
language could overcome triggering the exhaustion doctrine, 228 and
left unclear the lingering confusion of the Federal Circuit
regarding the conditional sale doctrine. Furthermore, because the
Supreme Court did not address the Federal Circuit's conditional
sale doctrine in Bowman, the Court will need to revisit the issue in
a later case. As noted in the Bowman oral arguments, Justice
Sotomayor recognized that the Court did not need to resolve the
221. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1329.
222. See, e.g., Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
223. Chiappetta, supra note 217, at 20; Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 100 1-02.
224. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 709 (holding that if a restriction on reuse was
within the scope of the patent grant or otherwise justified, then violation of the
restriction may be remedied by action for patent infringement).
225. See Princo, 616 F.3d 1329 at n.2 (citing USM Corp. v. SPS Techs.,
Inc. 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982)); see generally Chiappetta, supra note
217.
226. Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse
Doctrine,78 CAL. L. REv. 1599, 1614-20 (1990).
227. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1342 (J. Dyk, dissenting).
228. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7
(2008).
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conditional sale confusion with Bowman, but should with a future

case. 229
B. Patent Misuse in Monsanto Cases
As discussed above, Monsanto has proceeded to trial with
farmers eleven times and only two of these have proceeded to the
point at which the respective farmers could petition the Supreme
In these two cases, Monsanto Co. v.
Court for certiorari.
McFarling and Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, the Federal Circuit
rejected each farmer's argument of patent misuse.
First, in Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,farmer Homan McFarling
argued that Monsanto had committed patent misuse by
impermissibly tying an unpatented product, the germplasm, to a
patented product, the genetic trait.230 McFarling proposed that
Monsanto could permit farmers to save and replant the Roundup
Ready seed each year, with annual payment of a technology fee,
instead of requiring the farmer to buy both the germplasm and
Roundup Ready trait each year. 231' The Federal Circuit held that
McFarling's tying allegations were not sufficient to successfully
raise a patent misuse defense.232 First, the court found that
McFarling and other farmers would be able to buy genetically
unmodified soybean germplasm.23 3 Second, the court also found
that McFarling did not seek and would not be able to perform
under a license to purchase, make, or use the patented genetic trait
before its insertion into the seed.234
Second, in Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, Scruggs asserted that
Monsanto's practices violated federal and state antitrust laws and
constituted patent misuse.235 Specifically, Scruggs focused on the
exclusivity provisions, no replant policies, and technology fee
payments required by Monsanto's licensing agreements as
229.
606035,
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Oral Argument, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796, 2013 WL
at *49.
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1342.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1339.
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anticompetitive practices.236 The Federal Circuit quickly held
these practices as within Monsanto's valid exercise of rights under
the patent laws.237 Scruggs also argued that Monsanto tied the
purchase of its seed through its licensing scheme.238 This argument
was also dismissed, as the Federal Circuit found that Scruggs did
not point to sufficient evidence to establish that Monsanto's
behavior constituted illegal tying.239
C. A Workable Solution
While the patent misuse defense has not been successful for
farmers at the Federal Circuit level, McFarling and Scruggs failed
to allege sufficient facts to show patent misuse.24 0 Their defenses
were erroneously dismissed, and the correct resolution should
proceed as the following discussion explains. With proper fact
allegations, farmers should be able to show Monsanto's patent
misuse at three alternatives of inquiry: by (1) showing that
Monsanto has illegally tied two products, (2) showing the
licensing arrangement's anticompetitive effect on the relevant

236. Id. at 1340.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. It is worth emphasizing here that there is an extreme misbalance
between the financial resources of the farmers litigating and Monsanto. Often
the litigating farmers have been pushed to the brink of bankruptcy by
Monsanto's actions against them. See Adam Liptak, Saving Seeds Subjects
Farmers

to

Suits

Over

Patents,

N.Y.

TIMES,

Nov.

2,

2003,

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/us/saving-seeds-subjects-farmers-to-suitsover-patent.html?pagewanted=2&src-pm. Additionally, most of the technology
agreements contain a forum selection clause, and farmers defending themselves
have to incur expensive travel and litigation costs. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY &
SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 1, at 40. The technology agreements require that

the exclusive jurisdiction and venue for all disputes are either the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern of Missouri or the Circuit Court of the County of St.
Louis, both located in Monsanto's headquarters. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra
note 38, at 21. Perhaps the farmers' failure to sufficiently allege patent misuse
may be influenced by their lack of financial resources necessary to litigate such
a claim.
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market, and (3) showing that Monsanto's
overreached and offended public policy.

131
practices

have

1. Tying Arrangements
One way that farmers could defend against patent infringement
lawsuits from Monsanto would be to allege that Monsanto has
conditioned the license or sale of its patented trait on the license or
purchase of the separate germplasm.24 ' If farmers could show that
Monsanto's licensing scheme created a tying arrangement with
market power in the relevant market, which is patent misuse,242
they could show that Monsanto has violated several antitrust
statutes and could fight the prohibition on saving seeds.243 While
tying arrangements used to be entitled to a presumption under a
per se rule, a decision that there is a tying arrangement must be
supported by proof of power in the relevant market. 2"
For a farmer to establish an illegal tying arrangement, he must
"prove that there is a tying arrangement between two separate
products where the seller has market power in the tying product
and the tying arrangement forecloses a substantial part of the
market."2 45 In this case, the two separate products are the actual
seed (germplasm) and that patented Roundup Ready gene; there is
sufficient consumer demand for the products to be provided
separately.246 However, in the case of saved seeds, the element of
sufficient consumer demand for separate products is trickier for the
farmer to show, since he does not want to buy seeds from another
dealer. Instead, the farmer wishes to use his own seeds saved from
the previous season. Therefore, farmers are forced to buy new
germplasm with the patented genetic trait inserted annually.
Indeed, McFarling pointed out that he would even pay an annual
241. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2012).
242. See Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 3031(1931).
243. Smith, supra note 39, at 642.
244. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 42-43; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5).
245. Smith, supra note 39, at 642 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2
v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 2 (1984), abrogatedby Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 28).
246. Id. (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S.
451, 461-62 (1992)).
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licensing fee each year for using the Roundup Ready trait.247 This
must be indicative of other farmers' views: saving seed was
historically engrained in agricultural history before Monsanto's
licensing practices.248
Second, a farmer must show that Monsanto has market power in
the tying product. 249 Properly narrowed, this market should be
The
genetically modified seeds in the United States.2 50
consolidation of the seed industry and Monsanto's resulting
market power was discussed above, 2 51 but it is worth repeating that
Monsanto's genetically engineered Roundup Ready soybeans are
planted on 93% of soybean acreage as of 2012.252 While a patent
alone cannot establish a presumption of market power, a farmer
should clearly be able to show other "proof of power in the
relevant market" that Monsanto has created through its patents,
licensing arrangements, and seed firm acquisitions.253
2. Anticompetitive Effect
Alternatively, instead of alleging tying arrangements, farmers
should be able to show that Monsanto's patents and licensing
arrangements tend to unlawfully restrain competition in the
relevant market. While the Department of Justice (DOJ) closed its
investigation of Monsanto for antitrust violations without taking
any enforcement action, patent misuse should encompass a broader
range of violations.254 Because Monsanto's licensing arrangement
has effectively eliminated competition in the genetically modified

247. McFarling,363 F.3d at 1342.
248. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2006); ROBIN, supra note 41, at 205.
249. Smith, supra note 39, at 644.
250. Id. at 645.
251. See supra Part III.B.
252. Brief for the American Soybean Association, et al. as Amici Curiae,
supra note 116, at *8.
253. Smith, supra note 39, at 644 (citing Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 31
(where the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that a tying product is
patented does not support the presumption that the seller has market power)).
254. Feldman, supra note 212, at 400 ("Antitrust law is designed to address
only particular types of harm, and it cannot reach everything that patent policy
addresses.").
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seed market, courts should find that its actions constitute patent
misuse. Farmers would then have a defense against Monsanto's
patent infringement actions for their seed saving practices.
Some courts have advocated applying antitrust rules to patent
misuse questions.25 5 While antitrust rules cover a narrower, more
specific range of harms, Monsanto's treatment under antitrust rules
would be a useful place to start a patent misuse analysis.
Monsanto has been investigated by state attorneys general and
federal DOJ officials for antitrust violations. State attorneys
general, such as in Texas and Iowa, initiated inquiries in 2007,
looking into whether Monsanto had used its dominance in the seed
In their
industry to illegally maintain a monopoly. 2 56
investigations, state officials analyzed several provisions within
the licensing arrangements that required seed dealers to favor
Monsanto over their competitors.2 57 Via a public information
request, documents uncovered from the Texas investigation
suggest that state investigations were focused broadly on whether
Monsanto had used its dominance to maintain an illegal
monopoly. 258 The state investigations were closed in 2012 without
further action.259

255. Id. at 399 (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1428 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Va. Panel, 133 F.3d at 869; Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708).
256. Khan, supra note 108.
257. Id. "For example, one contract provision bans independent companies
from breeding plants that contain both Monsanto's genes and the genes of any
of its competitors, unless Monsanto gives prior written permission - giving
Monsanto the ability to effectively lock out competitors from inserting their
patented traits into the vast share of U.S. crops that already contain Monsanto's
Christopher Leonard, Monsanto Squeezes Out Seed Business
genes."
Competition, AP Investigation Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 13, 2009, 1:45

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/13/monsanto-squeezes-outPM),
see n 390354.html. Monsanto has also been reported to offer rebates if a seed
dealer's product line consisted of 70% Monsanto products. Khan, supra note
108.
258. Khan, supra note 108. These documents included research on
Monsanto's bundled pricing and how to police companies with intellectual
property rights for anticompetitive conduct. Id.
259. Press Release, Monsanto Co., Monsanto Company Announces Iowa
Attorney General and Working Group Have Closed Inquiry (Dec. 20, 2012),
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On the other hand, at the federal level, DOJ officials specifically
investigated Monsanto's licensing arrangements for Roundup
Ready soybean traits.260 For example, a Midwest seed owner
reported that, in an interview, DOJ officials had asked him very
specific questions about Monsanto's contracts, suggesting that the
DOJ did not investigate the layout of the seed industry or other
broad issues.2 6' However, the federal DOJ investigation was also
closed in 2012 without any enforcement action.262 Furthermore,
the DOJ did not issue a public statement on why the investigation
was closed, what types of conduct were investigated, or why no
enforcement remedies were pursued. 263 This lack of transparency
has disappointed many antitrust advocates, who note that the
"public is in the dark about how the DOJ will pursue concerns
involving intellectual property and competition in important
markets." 2 ' There are both cynical and non-cynical interpretations
of the termination of this investigation, such as that "[t]here was a
good case to be made, but at the end of the day nobody was
prepared to bite the bullet and move forward" given Monsanto's
political connections.2 65 Nevertheless, the fact that Monsanto's

available at www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/iowa-attomey-generalworking-group-closed-inquiry.aspx.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Press Release, Monsanto Co., Monsanto Notified that U.S. Department
of Justice Has Concluded its Inquiry (Nov. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/monsanto-notified-that-usdepartment-of-justice-has-concluded-its-inquiry.aspx
263. Lack of Transparency in the Closing of DOJ's Investigation into
Monsanto's Transgenic Seed Practices Disappoints Antitrust Advocates, AM.
ANTITRUST
INST.,
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/content/lacktransparency-closing-doj's-investigation-monsanto's-transgenic-seed-practicesdisappoin (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
264. Id.
265. Khan, supra note 108.
Cynical reasons include allegations of
Monsanto having a "revolving door in Washington," and pointing to its
significant lobbying expenditures. Id. However, seed companies have reported
that Monsanto began loosening up its licensing arrangements in 2008, at the
beginning of the investigations. Id. Additionally, Monsanto announced that it
would open the market up to generic competition once the Roundup Ready
patent expires in 2014. Id.
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conduct does not rise to an antitrust violation reinforces the need
for the patent misuse doctrine to police its anticompetitive
behavior, especially anticompetitive behavior perpetuated by its
patent licensing practices.266
Through its patents and licensing arrangements, Monsanto has
restrained competition unlawfully in its relevant market. As with
the tying analysis, Monsanto's relevant market is genetically
modified seeds in the United States.267 Courts need to then look at
the consolidation of the seed industry, and Monsanto's resulting
market share. Farmers would need to submit evidence on
Monsanto's, and other major seed companies', series of
acquisitions from 1996 to present. Additionally, farmers would
submit evidence about the number of independent seed companies
that have either been acquired or have gone bankrupt, and how that
has adversely affected the availability of non-Monsanto seeds.26 8
Beyond restraining competition in the genetically modified
seeds market, courts should also look at how Monsanto's practices
have eliminated one historic form of competition. Particularly,
courts should focus on Monsanto's licensing arrangements that
specifically prohibit saving seeds for replanting, and Monsanto's
investigative and prosecutorial actions towards farmers alleged to
have saved seed.2 69 These specific practices have eliminated
farmers' saving seed practices, which Monsanto regarded as
affecting competitive conditions.2 70 According to Monsanto, the
practice of saving seeds operated as a constraint on the pricing
freedom of the seed industry.27 '
Therefore, Monsanto's

266. See Princo, 616 F.3d at 1350 (J. Dyk, dissenting) ("The difficulty of
securing a misuse determination with respect to the suppressed patent or
traditional antitrust relief underscores the importance of applying the doctrine of
patent misuse to the protect patents. Unless the protected patents are held
unenforceable, there will be no adverse consequence to the patent holder for its
misconduct nor will the patent misuse be remedied.")
267. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
268. See supra Part 1II.C
269. See supra Parts II.B. 1-2.
270. ROBIN, supra note 41, at 205.
271. See Brief for Center for Food Safety & Save Our Seeds as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (2012),
2012 WL 6591149, at *22.
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enforcement of its Roundup Ready patent through licensing and
prosecution has eliminated at least one form of competition in the
seed industry.2 72
3. Expand Patent Misuse for Biodiversity Concerns
In addition to misuse in the antitrust context, some have
advocated that patent misuse should be expanded to restrain patent
practices that offend public policy.273 Patent misuse in this
iteration could cover patentee conduct that is contrary to the public
interest, such as "patent overreaching [that] violates our
sensibilities about justice and fairness and potentially threatens
public health."274 Under this framework, farmers would be able to
use patent misuse to fight Monsanto's practices that are found to
be contrary to public policy, even if the practices did not violate
any antitrust laws.275 This defense would, however, require a court
to evaluate the prohibition on saving seeds as a threat to public
policy, because of the loss of variety and biodiversity. As
discussed above, in the event where resistance is needed in an
emergency, plant pathologists may not be able to locate
resistance.' 76 In addition to overwhelming amounts of crop
devastation, the production of major food crops might not be able
to recuperate as it has in the past.277
Expansion of patent misuse has been favorably discussed, and
could be supported by, judicial precedent. For example, a district
court judge noted that "[i]t would be inappropriate to confine
patent misuse, as is sometimes suggested, to practices that violate
antitrust law, for in that event the doctrine would be
superfluous."278 He advocated for a more flexible, adaptable
272.

FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG'G, supra note 12, at

40.
273. Rowe, supra note 60, at 888 (citing SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1047 (N.D. Ill. 2003); C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d
at 1372; Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 704).
274. Rowe, supra note 60, at 888.
275. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 704.
276. See supra Part III.F.
277. See supra notes 186-192 and accompanying text.
278. SmithKline Beecham, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
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incarnation of the patent misuse doctrine:
When the advance of science well illustrated by the
products in this case enables a form of patent
misuse that is new but is well within the conceptual
heartland of the doctrine, the boundaries of the
doctrine can expand modestly to encompass it.
'The sea-changes in both law and technology stand
as a testament to the ability of law to adapt to new
and innovative concepts, while remaining true to
basic principles.'279
Monsanto's practices are within the "conceptual heartland" of the
patent misuse doctrine, because not only are they anticompetitive,
but they have also threatened plant variety and biodiversity in
service of Monsanto's economic gain. However, patent misuse
doctrine expansion to practices that offend public policy would
exceed "modest expansion" and would probably best be left to
Congressional policy judgments.
VII. DOES GENETIC SEED TECHNOLOGY NEED PATENT
PROTECTION?

While the doctrine of patent misuse should be used by farmers
to prevent Monsanto from overreaching the scope of its patent
protection, patent protection does inherently involve slight
overreaching.280 That reaching is "the harm society has decided
individuals must bear to obtain the [patent] regime's benefits."2 8'
The goal of the patent system is to promote the progress of the
useful arts. 2 By offering a limited right to exclude, patent law
induces inventions for the benefit of society.283
Therefore,
opponents of using patent misuse could argue that the benefits of
279. Id. (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
280. Chiappetta, supra note 217, at 4
281. Id.
282. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
283. Feldman, supra note 212, at 400.
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Monsanto's patent protection outweigh the anticompetitive harm
its patents and licensing arrangements cause. As a proxy to
determining whether Monsanto's patent protection does in fact
encourage invention, one can first examine whether patentability
on seeds has increased agricultural technology innovation. Then,
one needs to examine whether Monsanto's seed innovation is
performing its "vital market function" by producing new varieties
that increase output.284 In addition to the "societal value" of
Monsanto's patented technology, one must also examine the
practical value of Roundup to farmers in production, the group of
people Monsanto proclaims to help with its research and
development.28 5
A. Monsanto'sArgument
Monsanto has maintained that its restrictions on reproduction,
use, and transfer are essential to protecting the company's
investment in its patented technology.28 6 Without their finely
attuned ability to exclude, the company argues that its ability to
protect its patented technology would effectively be lost as soon as
the first generation of the product was introduced into the
market.287 Without patent protection, Monsanto might argue, their
high investments would be lost; Monsanto typically takes an
average of ten years and $100 million to develop and
commercialize a new product.28 8 While Monsanto can spend
284. Chiappetta, supra note 217, at 10-11.
285. Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, MONSANTO CO.,
www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/why-does-monsanto-sue-farmers-whosave-seeds.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
286. Brief for Respondents, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (2013),
2013 WL 179941, at *31-32.
287. Id.
288. Amanda Welters, Note, Striking a Balance: Revising USDA
Regulations to Promote Competition Without Stifling Innovation, 13 MINN. J.L.
Scl. & TECH. 407, 411-12 (2012) (citing Jeffrey Tomich, Monsanto Growth
Faltersas SmartStax Yields, Pricing Raise Questions, STLTODAY.COM (Oct. 6,
2010, 12:05 AM)). Monsanto spends about $2.6 million per day to develop and
commercialize new products. Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save
Seeds?, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/why-doesmonsanto-sue-farmers-who-save-seeds.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
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astronomical amounts of money on developing and marketing the
new seed, it will always be cheap for others to replicate it.289
The American Soybean Association, in an amicus curiae brief to
the Supreme Court, echoes this argument: "a loss of patent
protection is likely to result in the loss of substantial research
dollars currently devoted towards developing improved plant
varieties."29 0 Its brief points to the USDA Free Agricultural Seed
Program, where seed purchasers were not barred from saving
seeds, to show that little progress was made to increase seed
productivity.2 9' Private seed breeders were "crowded" from the
marketplace, had little control over the fate of their genetic
material, and were not compensated when purchasers saved seed
or sold new seeds they grew.292
B. Does Patentabilityof Seeds Lead to HigherInnovation?
Monsanto argues that without patent protection, its investment
into developing and commercializing new products would be lost.
Therefore, after losing that investment, Monsanto (as well as other
large agricultural giants) would not be incentivized to innovate.
Monsanto's argument that seed patent protection is necessary for
innovation can be analyzed in two parts: patent protection leads to
(1) an increase in research and development, or (2) the creation of
new seed varieties.
One can look at indicators of innovation, such as research and
development expenditures or applications for field testing.
Evidence has suggested that these two indicators have either
decreased due to patent protection or increased, but due to private
289. Elizabeth I. Winston, What If Seeds Were Not Patentable?,2008 MIcH.
ST. L. REV. 321, 344 (2008).
290. Brief for American Soybean Association, et al. as Amici Curiae, supra
note 116, at *7.
291. Id. at 10-11. The free seed distribution program seed collection started
in 1819, and Congress did not terminate the program until 1930. Id The
program quickly grew to an enormous size after placed under the jurisdiction of
USDA after its establishment in 1862. Id. Using this program as an example,
the amici looked at the period of 1866 to 1930, showing that the average
national yield for corn decreased from 24.3 to 20.5 bushels per acre. Id
292. Id. at 11.
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ordering instead. First, due to the seed industry consolidation
trend described above, there are obviously fewer players in the
seed industry. A decrease in the number of players that are
sponsoring research leads to a decrease in innovation. This result
can be seen in the findings made by the USDA Economic
Research Service, which show that the few major players that
"survived" the seed industry consolidation are sponsoring "less
research relative to the size of their individual markets than when
more companies were involved."293
Additionally, Monsanto's license agreements prohibit research
or experimentation and growing of the crops for research purposes,
which arguably chills innovation.29 4 Critics of Monsanto and other
biotechnology seed companies argue that independent research on
the "critical questions" could not be legally conducted.295 Because
university scientists cannot freely buy genetically engineered seeds
for research without seeking permission from seed companies,
scientists argue that the environmental and health consequences
cannot be examined.29 6 Furthermore, that permission is often
denied or made conditional upon the seed company's review of the
findings before publication, allowing seed companies to "control
the research that appears in the public domain" and "reduce the
potential negatives that can come out of any research."29 7 In
response to some of this criticism, Monsanto has made agreements
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and certain universities
providing access to its genetically engineered seeds.298 However,
293. FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG'G, supra note 12, at
17.
294. Rowe, supra note 60, at 873. These research restrictions arguably also
violate public policy, because scientists "cannot test seeds, compare one
company's seeds to another's, or investigate the environmental effects of
genetically modified crops." Id. at 874.
295. Andrew Pollack, Crop Scientists Say Biotechnology Seed Companies
Are
Thwarting
Research,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
19,
2009,
www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/business/20crop/html?r-0.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. 8 Ways Monsanto Fails at Sustainable Agriculture, UNION OF
www.ucsusa.org/foodand agriculture/our-failingCONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
food-system/genetic-engineering/eight-ways-monsanto-fails.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2013).
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these agreements are not binding, are not transparent to the public,
and still have industry restrictions.2 99 Monsanto, and other seed
companies, are still "driving the bus": for example, while the
Monsanto-USDA agreement allows the USDA to research crop
production practices, the agreement does not also cover
investigation into the health risks of genetically engineered
crops.300
Second, between 1987 and 1998, applications for field-testing of
new plant varieties increased by 13,300%.30'
This increase
correlated to a rise in plant patent and plant variety certificates, but
not utility patents.302 Therefore, one could assume that the increase
in field variety testing, which can be correlated to an increase in
research, was not attributable to utility patent protection. Instead,
increases in innovation could be attributable to private ordering
through licensing.
Additionally, seed patent protection might not be necessary for
the creation of new seed varieties. Empirical research has
suggested that many innovations have occurred without patent
law. 303 This study showed that only 3.8% of varieties available in
2004 were subject to private intellectual property rights.30 4
However, of the vegetable varieties available in 2004, only 6%
were available in 1904.30'
The researchers concluded that
intellectual property rights are not necessary to create new
varieties.306 Applying for protection "may simply be pure rent
seeking, a standard business practice, or the result of risk aversion
(defense patenting.)" 307

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id.
Id.
Winston, supra note 289, at 327.
Id.
Heald & Chapman, supra note 65, at 1093.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1094.
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C. Does PatentabilityofSeeds Lead to Higher Crop
Productivity?
As Monsanto argues, it needs patent protection of its seed
products in order to be incentivized to make progress in increasing
farm productivity. Monsanto has advertised future advances such
as drought-resistant crops that "will reset the bar for on-farm
While research has suggested that greater
productivity.""'
enforcement correlates to greater crop productivity, this research
cannot conclusively establish causation.309
Additionally,
traditional farming practices are also useful tools in increasing
crop productivity.
One study analyzed the correlation between utility patents and
crop productivity, using patent applications as a proxy for patents
A strong correlation was found between patent
granted."'o
applications and soybean production, yield, and hectares planted."'
Additionally, comparing the United States' enforcement regime to
that of other countries, the researchers found a significant, positive
correlation to soybean yield, production, exports, and imports.3 12
That correlation did not exist for the other countries that had
weaker enforcement regimes."
However, other studies have shown that yield rates have
increased, but not as a result of GE-crops. Yield rate may be the
product of preexisting, non-GE properties of the germplasm
(intrinsic yield rate).314 There are no current transgenic varieties
308. Lapp6, supra note 5.
309. See generally A. Bryan Endres & Carly E. Giffin, Necessity is the
Mother, But ProtectionMay Not be the Fatherof Invention: The Limited Effect
of IntellectualProperty Regimes on AgriculturalInnovation, 14 COLUM. ScL &
TECH. L. REV. 203, 244 (2013).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 245-46.
312. Id. at 248. The researchers also noted that the United States utility
patent system was different from the other countries examined in that it allows
for separate protection of the process to develop the genetically improved seed
and the plant itself Id.
313. Id.
314. DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, FAILURE
TO YIELD: EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED

CROPS

2

(Apr.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol24/iss1/4
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that enhance intrinsic yield rate,' 5 which is a product of plant
breeding instead of genetic engineering. " Roundup Ready
soybeans and other transgenic varieties purport to increase
operational yield by resistance to pesticide. Some data show that
herbicide-resistant varieties have not improved operational yield
rates."
Therefore, one cannot conclusively determine that
stronger patent enforcement is necessary for greater crop
productivity. Furthermore, allowing farmers to save seeds based
on yield rates, drought resistance, adaptation to soil and climates
may increase the intrinsic yield of seeds with genetic traits
increasing operational yield rates.
D. Is Monsanto's PatentProtectionHelping or Harming
Farmers?
Beyond a broad evaluation of Monsanto's patent protection's
value to society, one must also specifically look at its practical
effect on the group of people most affected by its practicesfarmers. To defend its patent enforcement practices, Monsanto
asserts that it invests more than $2.6 million per day in research
and development to benefit farmers."' Monsanto's attitude that
"[tihe vast majority of farmers understand and appreciate
[Monsanto's] research and are willing to pay for [Monsanto's]
inventions and the value they provide," 3 9 reflects another
understanding that so many farmers continue to use the Roundup
weed control system because of its value to farmers.3 20 This value
to farmers is the simplicity of the Roundup herbicide with
Roundup Ready seeds, allowing for broad spectrum weed control
at a low cost.3 2' However, Monsanto's patent protection and
licensing practices have gradually eroded these practical benefits
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/food-and agriculture/failure-toyield.pdf.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. MONSANTO, supra note 285.
319. Id.
320. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
321. Id.
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to its farming consumers. With the consolidation of the seed
market, there has been an unprecedented increase in the cost of
Furthermore, there have been several instances of
seeds.
glyphosate-resistant weeds, requiring farmers to use additional
herbicides to achieve broad spectrum weed control. Together,
these examples show that Monsanto's patent protection and
licensing practices have offset any economic and practical benefits
that farmers might incur from using genetically modified seeds, in
turn, harming the American farmer.
The dramatically increasing cost of genetically-engineered
seeds, caused by biotech trait royalty fees, has offset any economic
benefit provided to farmers.322 A survey of growers found that the
mean reported benefit of Roundup Ready compared to
conventional varieties was monetarily valued by farmers to be
$23.20 per acre.323 However, this monetary benefit to farmers is
dwarfed by the increase in the price of seeds since Roundup Ready
seeds were introduced. Between 1975 and 1995, before Roundup
Ready seeds were introduced into the seed market, the price of
seeds per planted acre increased by 60%.324 In stark contrast,
between 1995 and 2011, the period of years following the
introduction of Roundup Ready seeds, the price of seeds per
planted acre increased by 325%.325 A large portion of the price
increase of Roundup Ready seeds is the "technology fee," paid
under the second licensing tier of Monsanto's distribution scheme
for the patented trait in addition to the actual cost of the seed.3 2 6
Between 1996 and 2008, this technology fee has increased from
$4.50 to $17.50. As discussed above, because of the consolidation
of the seed market, farmers effectively have no choice but to pay
the higher seed price.327

The exorbitant increase in the cost of

Monsanto seeds claims a greater share of farmers' operating costs,
322. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS supra note 1, at 18.
323. Terrance M. Hurley, Paul D. Mitchell, & George B. Frisvold, Effects of
Weed Resistance Concerns and Resistance Management Practices on the Value
ofRoundup Ready®@ Crops, 12 J. BIOTECH. MGMT. & ECON. (2010), available at

www.agbioforum.org/vl2n34/vl2n34a05-mitchel.htm
324. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS supra note 1, at 16.
325. Id.
326. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
327. See supra Part 0.
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gross crop income, and net return per acre.3 28 In other words,
"[t]his means [that] a farmer who plants one bag of Roundup
Ready soybeans per acre on 1,000 acres has seen his production
costs increase by $11,000 in five years."3 29 Therefore, even if the
Roundup system offers an economic benefit to farmers-broad
spectrum weed control at a lower cost-that economic benefit is
increasingly undermined by the costs of the Roundup Ready seeds.
Eventually, "[i]f these GE seed price and income trends continue,
the consequences for farmers will be of historic significance, as
dollars once earned and retained by farmers are transferred to the

seed industry." 330
In addition to historic increases in the prices of seeds, the "broad
spectrum" weed control ability of Roundup is eroding, as more and
more weeds have developed glyphosate-resistance. In 1997, there
were no glyphosate-resistant weed species in the United States;
however, by 2005, that number had already grown to six.' These
''super-weeds" are a result of Monsanto and the Roundup weed
control system, which encourages farmers to rely on a single
herbicide, even discouraging traditional resistance management
approaches. 332 Moreover, these "super-weeds" cannot be easily,
effectively, or economically controlled.3 33 To combat the problem,
farmers are increasing overall herbicide use and using heavy
tillage, in contrast to two of the "environmental" benefits that the
Roundup system was advertised and thought to offer.
Additionally, other weed management practice recommendations

328.

329.
22.
330.

CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS supranote 1, at 18.
FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG'G supra note

12, at

CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS supra note 1, at 18

(quoting Dr. Charles Benbrook, agricultural economist).
331. CHRIS BOERBOOM & MICHAEL OWEN, FACTS ABOUT GLYPHOSATERESISTANT
WEEDS
5
(2006),
available
at

weedscience.missouri.edu/publications/gwc-1.pdf.
332. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS supra note 298. These approaches
include alternating the types of herbicides used over time. Id, Some suggest
that Monsanto discourages these practices because it would reduce the amount
of Roundup sold in a given year, and "cut into the company's bottom line." Id.
333.

Id.

334. Id. See also supra note 30 and accompanying text.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

51

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4

146

DEPAULJ. ART, TECH. &IPLAW

[Vol.XXIV:95

to "lessen the potential for developing glyphosate-resistant weeds"
include rotating Roundup with other herbicides or applying a
residual herbicide before Roundup."' The need to manage
glyphosate-resistance by using other herbicides alongside
Roundup also undermines another advertised benefit of
Roundup-the ability to control weeds with only one product.33 6
Thus, because of the increased price of Roundup Ready seeds to
use with Roundup, and the emergence of glyphosate-resistant
weeds, Roundup increasingly cannot provide broad spectrum weed
control at a low cost to farmers.
There is no conclusive data on whether Monsanto's patent
protection is necessary to increase innovation, create new varieties,
or lead to higher crop productivity, or whether private ordering
will instead spur these advances. However, the "innovation"
valued by farmers as users of Monsanto's technologies-one
herbicide able to provide broad spectrum weed control at low
costs-has been undermined by steep technology fee increases and
glyphosate resistance. Furthermore, this "innovation" valued by
farmers in production, monetarily estimated only at just over $20
per acre,337 seriously underestimates the social value of the lost
innovation and biodiversity. Regardless of whether seed patent
protection increases innovation, creates new varieties, leads to
higher productivity, or provides value to farmers, the bottom line
is that "[i]f we jeopardize this biodiversity for the sake of a
possible wonder trait for tomorrow, then we won't have any
wonder traits for the day after tomorrow.""' In other words, if
courts and Congress continue to allow Monsanto to use its patents
and licenses to prohibit farmers from saving seeds, agriculture will
become increasingly uniform. In the face of potential pest or
disease crises, scientists will be unable to locate resistance among
genetically uniform crops. As a result, Monsanto will be unable to
create a drought-resistant soybean if the soybean crop is devastated
and unable to recover.
335.
336.
337.
338.
biology

BOERBOOM & OWEN supra note 331, at 7.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
Lapp6, supra note 5 (quoting Jack Heinemann, professor of molecular
at New Zealand's University of Canterbury).
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VIII. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Monsanto's utility patents on the Roundup Ready
soybean are directly linked to decreasing crop diversity. The
advent of utility patents spurred the consolidation of the seed
industry, with major firms such as Monsanto strategically
acquiring smaller, independent seed companies. The top firms that
survived the consolidation movement, thus, each have large shares
of the seed industry, to the detriment of the industry's competitive
nature.
Independent seed companies are increasingly
disappearing, along with the farmers' options to choose other, nonMonsanto seeds. Farmers have been restricted from continuing the
traditional farming practice of seed saving, which has wreaked
havoc on the genetic and varietal diversity of United States
agriculture crops. The resulting "plague of sameness" is
dangerous; as examples of monocultures throughout history have
shown, crops have a heightened vulnerability to pests and diseases.
Furthermore, in the event that genetic resistance to either of those
threats needs to be located, the genetic variability to do so is
disappearing.
Therefore, something must be done to halt this impending
diversity crisis. However, Monsanto has continually prevailed
over farmer-defendants at the district court, Federal Circuit, and
Supreme Court levels. The defense of patent misuse, the judicial
application of which has been confusing, should be revisited.
Farmers should be able to factually show an illegal tying
arrangement, but in the alternative should be able to show that
Monsanto's patents and enforcements practices have had an
anticompetitive effect or have violated public policy. The
reasoning for allowing the successful patent misuse defense
becomes even stronger when considering the conflicting evidence
of whether Monsanto's patent protection is necessary for
innovation, productivity, or the creation of new varieties.
Monsanto's practices have had a chilling effect on research and
seed saving, and as a result, have stifled innovation, productivity,
and the creation of new varieties. Furthermore, Monsanto's patent
protection and licensing practices have cumulatively harmed its
farmer consumers through increased prices and weed management
difficulty.
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With the Roundup Ready patent expiration date looming in
2014, some argue that Monsanto's anticompetitive behavior will
be ameliorated.3 39 However, Monsanto has already patented
Roundup Ready 2, a second version of the glyphosate-resistant
technology.340 Many have reported that Monsanto plans to use
conditions in contracts with seed dealers "that would unfairly push
farmers to buy its new Roundup Ready 2 Yield soybeans and away
from the first-generation, lower-priced Roundup Ready beans."34 1
Without current legislation to "oversee the transition to generic"
Roundup Ready beans,342 there is no way to predict how Monsanto
will use either the Roundup Ready or Roundup Ready 2 patents.
Nevertheless, due to the concerns of losing any more biodiversity,
the world cannot afford to wait.
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